INTRODUCTION
International cooperation is indispensable for combating piracy. To that end, this chapter argues that a duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy exists under international law. This duty, as articulated in article 100 of UNCLOS, should serve as a guiding principle in identifying the specific obligations imposed on states. Among these specific obligations is the duty to share relevant information that can assist in preventing piracy attacks and in facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates. It is further submitted that successful undertakings to fight maritime piracy necessitate inter-disciplinary cooperation, namely cooperation among entities with expertise in different fields. This chapter further discusses the main challenges associated with information sharing, and it proposes solutions to meet them.
COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: THE DUTY TO COOPERATE

The primary legal sources underlying the duty to cooperate
Combating maritime piracy requires commitment and active engagement by states. As indicated by Mr. Helmut Tuerk, the honorable justice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, regional cooperation in this domain was also highlighted by the U.N. General Assembly in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea. 250 Notably, article 100 of UNCLOS, titled "Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy," specifies that " [a] ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."
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The duty to cooperate is at the core of the piracy section of UNCLOS. Indeed, it is the first provision of this section, thereby providing an appropriate benchmark as well as framework for the substantive provisions that follow. Moreover, while international cooperation is a common theme of UNCLOS, 252 article 100 is unique in two ways. First, it is the only provision in UNCLOS in which the title is the duty to cooperate. 253 Secondly, it uses the strongest wording found in UNCLOS with regard to this obligation; namely, that all states shall cooperate "to the fullest possible extent." 252 See Tanaka, supra note 48, at 4 (explaining how international cooperation and spatial distribution of national jurisdiction are the two basic functions of UNCLOS). 253 Compare with other cooperation-related sections or provisions in UNCLOS such as Section 2 (titled Global and Regional Co-operation) of Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment) or Section 2 (titled "International Co-operation") of Part XIII (Marine Scientific Research). The titles of those provisions do not make a specific reference to the "duty to cooperate." 254 Article 100, UNCLOS (emphasis added). Compare with the wording of other UNCLOS provisions mentioning that "States shall co-operate" (articles 108 and 109) or "should co-operate" (article 123) or even "may co-operate" (e.g., article 129). Other provisions provide that "States shall co-operate actively" (article 273) or refer to
Article 100 of UNCLOS contains the precise wording of article 14 of the 1958 HSC, which in turn incorporated (again, verbatim) the corresponding article adopted by the 1956 ILC Report. 255 All of these provisions went beyond the proposal put together in the scholarly work of the Harvard Research Draft, 256 which later served as the basis for the discussions of piracy by the ILC and the negotiations of the piracy provisions in the HSC. Article 18 of the Harvard Research
Draft provided that " [t] he parties to this convention agree to make every expedient use of their powers to prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation." The commentary to this provision underscored that article 18 imposes on states only "a general discretionary obligation to discourage piracy by exercising their rights of prevention and punishment as far as is expedient." 257 By establishing a duty to cooperate, UNCLOS and the HSC therefore send a clearer message than originally foreseen in the proposal of the Harvard Research Draft.
Both UNCLOS and HSC, however, did not set out the precise obligations that fall within the scope of the general duty to cooperate, 258 thereby leaving this provision open to interpretation with regard to the means that states should employ to sufficiently fulfill their obligation. At the very least, however, it is evident that inaction or failure to cooperate in response to piratical acts-where both the factual circumstances and the applicable legal framework allow for action and cooperation-cannot be reconciled with the duty as prescribed by article 100. The ILC, in its commentary to the 1956 ILC Report, clearly stated that " [a] ny State having an opportunity of cooperation "to the extent possible" (article 199). None of these therefore contain the clearest instruction on cooperation as prescribed by article 100. Id. at 437-38, 44-44, 479, 505. 255 The 1956 ILC Report, supra note 23.
256 Harvard Research Draft, supra note 20.
257 Harvard Research Draft, supra note 20, at 746, 760. 258 Compare to other sections of UNCLOS that specify the various areas and means of cooperation such as article 123 on cooperation of states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, or article 143 on collaboration in the field of marine scientific research.
taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law." 259 Similarly, the Lang Report underscored that the degree of flexibility provided by the wording of article 100 "should not be used as a pretext for failure to As indicated earlier in this chapter, UNCLOS uses the strongest wording when referring to the duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy (cooperation "to the fullest possible extent").
It is also noteworthy that among the factors to be considered when determining the applicable standard of due diligence are the specific risks generated by the case or activity at hand. 280 In that regard, it is indisputable that piracy presents serious risks to the international community, as manifested, inter alia, by the unprecedented number of UNSC resolutions adopted on the matter in a relatively short period of time. Accordingly, in the counter-piracy field, the standard of due diligence should be higher than minimum or even reasonable efforts; rather, it should be based on the "best efforts" test. Stated differently, compliance with article 100 of UNCLOS would require sincere, concerted, and proactive efforts to cooperate internationally in the repression of maritime piracy.
As due diligence is a flexible concept, 281 assessing its standard requires analysis of not only the particular field of law, but also of the specific obligation within the general duty to 279 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea concluded that "The sponsoring State's obligation 'to ensure'" is "an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result."
Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion, supra note 270, ¶ 110 (emphasis added). guarantee that in utilizing an international watercourse significant harm would not occur. It is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result."). See also Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion, supra note 270, ¶ 110 ("The sponsoring State's obligation 'to ensure' is not an obligation to achieve, in each and every case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the aforementioned obligations. Rather, it is an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in international law, this obligation may be characterized as an obligation 'of conduct' and not 'of result', and as an obligation of 'due diligence'" (emphasis added).).
Article 100 as the guiding principle in identifying the specific duties imposed on states
A detailed listing and in-depth discussion of all the specific duties required pursuant to article 100's general obligation to cooperate exceeds the scope of this chapter. For the purpose of the current discussion, it is submitted that certain duties can be identified based on a holistic interpretation of the piracy section of UNCLOS, which is derived from a joint reading of article 100 and the substantive provisions of the piracy section. Stated differently, UNCLOS' piracy provisions should be interpreted and implemented in light of the general guideline-namely the duty to cooperate-prescribed by article 100.
Thus, for example, a key provision under UNCLOS is article 105, which reads:
"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every
State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith."
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Commentators have pointed to the hortatory characteristic of the provision, notably due to the use of the verb "may" throughout this article. identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect." 288 As manifested by the title of the provision ("Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy"),
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the use of the term "may" in this article indicates which vessels or aircrafts are allowed to conduct the seizure, rather than whether states have the discretion or an obligation to carry out such acts.
Consequently, the use of the term "may" in these provisions does not imply that a state has complete discretion over whether to act. The concrete measures to be applied by states as part of their general duty to cooperate are determined based on the characteristics of the particular threat and the circumstances of each case. Whatever the specific measures are, however, information exchange is vital to ensure successful international cooperation in counter-piracy operations.
Indeed, the duty to share information can be identified as a particular obligation within the general duty to cooperate. This conclusion is supported by relevant international instruments. As explained by Justice Tuerk in reference to that provision: "there is a duty for States
Parties that have a reason to believe that an offense set forth in the [SUA] Convention will be committed to furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information to those States having established jurisdiction over such offenses."
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In addition, the UNSC resolutions related to the suppression of piracy and armed robbery at sea also urge all states to share information on acts related to piracy and armed robbery at sea. 296 The U.N. General Assembly has also emphasized the importance of information sharing as part of international cooperation in addressing the problem of piracy.
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On the regional level, the need for information sharing as a means of promoting cooperation in the suppression of piracy was a prime motivator for Asian states in adopting the would be reasonable to contend that activities of a piratical nature pose a "danger to navigation"
within the meaning of article 24(2), thereby requiring the coastal state to warn other states of such known activity in its territorial waters. Beyond the territorial sea, the duty to forewarn is a corollary obligation of the duty to cooperate enshrined in article 100 of UNCLOS, and by other relevant instruments, such as the SUA Convention and the abovementioned UNSC resolutions.
THE NATURE OF COOPERATION: A CALL FOR HOLISTIC INTER-DISCIPLINARY COOPERATION
Having established the existence of a general duty to cooperate and to share information, consideration should be given to the nature of the required cooperation in combating maritime piracy. Specifically, this chapter proposes a departure from the traditional concepts related to crime prevention in favor of adopting a holistic, inter-disciplinary paradigm for cooperation. This shift in the risks posed to our societies necessitates adjustment on two levels. First, substantive changes are necessary, namely with regard to the type of tasks carried out by each actor. Thus, for example, military forces might be requested to engage in activities of a law enforcement nature, and police forces might be asked to investigate illegal activities which, in the past, have not been considered "typical" ordinary law crimes in the strict sense of that term.
Second, and stemming also from these substantive changes, institutional-or, more precisely, inter-institutional-adjustments are required. Concretely, there is a need to involve all relevant actors in this process-hence, the call for a holistic approach-and to establish cooperation among agencies and institutions whose role, mandate, and general activities may often be significantly different from one another. Enabling and coordinating the interaction between such bodies, namely inter-disciplinary cooperation, is not only desirable, but is in fact imperative.
The "holistic inter-disciplinary cooperation" paradigm is of particular relevance in the field of maritime piracy. Despite the fact that piracy is a classic crime, its geographic location requires the involvement of naval forces. In addition, the shipping industry is often in possession of valuable information that can be used for criminal investigations and prosecutions. Thus, there is clearly a need to establish collaboration among navies, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector. As will be discussed in the next section, such collaboration is not without challenges, yet it remains essential to successful counter-piracy undertakings.
CHALLENGES IN SHARING INFORMATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY
Sharing relevant information among states and international organizations is vital for combating piracy and should therefore be applied as the general standard procedure. Information exchange nonetheless faces a number of difficulties that will be addressed below.
Scope of the duty to share information and the "national security" exception
Frequently, the international instruments applicable to the suppression of piracy do not shed much light on the precise scope of the duty to share information. As already noted in this chapter, the duty to share information in reference to piracy is not explicitly mentioned in article 100 of UNCLOS (or elsewhere in the piracy section). 309 In the SUA Convention, the need to share information is mentioned, yet without further details. These restrictions-in particular, those based on the "national security" argument-can be used by states to justify their decision not to share information. 315 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the implementation of laws and regulations that prevent or restrict the exchange of information should be done only as an exception to the general obligation to share information deriving from article 100 and the due diligence principle. Thus, if a state possesses relevant data, and it neglects-or even refuses-to share it, it carries the burden of justifying such a position.
This approach is grounded in the wording of provisions such as the abovementioned article 302 of UNCLOS, which allows non-disclosure of information only for purposes of 
3.5.2.A. Navies carrying out law enforcement activities
Since piracy takes place on the high seas, and often very far from the shore, combating piratical acts requires more than the typical police-prosecution cooperation, which is predominant in landbased ordinary law crimes such as theft or robbery. Notably, it calls for the involvement of navies as the front-line entities that both prevent attacks and gather relevant information to facilitate prosecution. In fact, in such operations, the navies exercise activities of a law enforcement nature. This unique feature in combating maritime piracy creates certain problems including those related to information exchange. important data such as personal information on suspects, fingerprints, and DNA can be stored and compared with existing data. Such expertise and tools are at the core of law enforcement activities and international police cooperation. The relative lack of involvement of the police in those early stages therefore created a gap, or a "missing link," between the navies operating off the coast of Somalia and the prosecution services.
The growing recognition of the need to engage all relevant actors, including the law enforcement community, as part of the holistic inter-disciplinary paradigm, led to welcome changes in the mindset that guided the international community in the early stages of combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Operation Atalanta, which is the European Union military operation off the coast of Somalia.
The amended framework explicitly instructs Operation Atalanta to: (1) collect data including characteristics likely to assist in identification of piracy suspects such as fingerprints; and (2) circulate, via INTERPOL's channels, and check against INTERPOL's databases, personal data concerning suspects, including fingerprints and other identifiers (e.g., name, DOB, etc.).
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A third example concerns the updates introduced in the fourth version of the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4). In the BMP4, produced and supported by a number of prominent players in the civil industry and naval forces, a specific chapter was added on cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
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These three examples illustrate a positive shift in the strategic view of counter-piracy
undertakings. Yet, certain complexities related to the exchange of information between navies and law enforcement entities had to be addressed. First, as a matter of normal procedure, navies tend to designate the data they collect as "classified information." This poses serious impediments with regard to the use of such data for the purpose of prosecution on the national level, as well as in the context of international collaboration with entities (i.e., countries or international organizations) that generally do not have access to classified information. As an example from INTERPOL's practice, this issue had to be addressed during the discussions that 
3.5.2.B. Interaction with the shipping industry
Another important player in the fight against maritime piracy is the private sector, including ship owners, operators, and insurance companies. 333 The role of shipping companies is particularly important in the field of sharing information, since they have access to crucial data and are also in a position to enable the collection of evidence by the police.
Nonetheless, cooperation and sharing of information between the private sector and law enforcement bodies has not been seamless. First, the shipping industry had to be sensitized to the importance of post-incident reporting, preserving the crime scene for the purpose of evidence 330 For further discussion of article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution and specifically on the application of the "purpose and nature" test in the field of maritime piracy, see Yaron Gottlieb, An additional difficulty concerns the trust gap between the shipping industry and other entities, notably governmental authorities such as navies and law enforcement agencies. This 334 BMP4, supra note 327, sec. 12. See also IMO, supra note 78, ¶ ¶ 6.7-6.9 (discussing the securing of evidence); S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 248, pmbl. (underlining "the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia"). The UNSC further welcomed "the ongoing work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance for the successful prosecution of acts of piracy of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings." S.C.
Res. 2077, supra. In that resolution, the UNSC further urged States "to make their citizens and vessels available for The proliferation of new information sharing networks raises a number of challenges.
First, it creates confusion as to which network should be used and which entity should be approached in a particular case. This problem is even more acute where the possessor of the information, who wants to share it, is not accustomed to communicating with entities from other disciplines-for example where a private shipping company wishes to communicate information to the navy or the police.
In addition, the abundance of networks frequently leads to two extreme and problematic situations related to the circulation of an item of information. One extreme is a case where an item is circulated simultaneously in different networks, and consequently, users that are connected to these networks receive the exact same item multiple times. Where information centers and networks have already been created, and identifying a single point of contact among them is not feasible, consideration should be given to integrating their work through applying an interoperability paradigm, namely identifying means to connect and synchronize the various existing networks, thereby creating a "network of networks."
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From a technical perspective, this will ensure, for example, that a search in one system will generate responses from all other inter-connected networks and will therefore avoid the need to check each system individually.
law enforcement/prosecution agencies currently pursuing piracy investigations/prosecution, and the World Bank to better understand how illicit financial flows associated with maritime piracy are moving in the area."). 350 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 338, at 135 ("The best way to integrate the various governments networks . . . into a more recognizable structure of world order is to create networks of networks."). See also id. ch. 4, pt. 1 (discussing this idea further).
Finally, the already existing international and regional structures for sharing piracyrelated information can generally provide adequate support and meet the needs for information exchange. Accordingly, prior to creating a new center or network in this field, it is recommended that states carefully assess the added value in such an undertaking and ensure that this would not in fact exacerbate the already existing problems discussed above. Indeed, this cautious approach was echoed in recent international instruments. Sharing information is one of the specific duties within the general duty to cooperate. It should therefore lead to a regular exchange of relevant data among all actors involved.
Restrictions based on national security and classification rules should be applied only on an exceptional basis.
351 See S.C. Res. 2039, supra note 249, ¶ 7 (encouraging "the States of the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC, to develop and implement transnational and transregional maritime security coordination centres covering the whole region of the Gulf of Guinea, building on existing initiatives, such as those under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)" (emphasis added)); Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, pmbl.
(emphasizing "the importance of building on existing national, regional and extraregional initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea" (emphasis added)).
